A STUDY ON THE ALLIANCE OF SAHELIAN STATES (AES)
Accra Centre for Applied
Research Study Report No. 8
ALLIANCE OF SAHELIAN STATES
2024
Prepared by the staff team of ACAR
April 29, 2024
All enquiries should be channeled to:
The Head of Research, #96 George Walker Bush Highway,
North Dzorwulu, Accra. Ghana
All rights reserved. No part of this report may be cited
or reproduced without a written permission of ACAR.
ALLIANCE OF SAHELIAN
STATES – A STUDY
Abstract
In the last four years for instance, there had been
seven successfully prosecuted military coups d’états in Guinea (2), Mali (2),
Burkina Faso (2) and Niger (1). In addition to these military interventions,
there were occasions of numerous manipulations and undermining of the
constitutions in Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Mali, Burkina Faso and
Niger led by democratically elected incumbent or sitting civilian governments
who sought to change the basic laws of the land in order to entrench themselves
in power. In most instances, these had resulted in disastrous social and
political consequences. Some of these reflections could be seen as fractious
contestation for power, constitutional coups d’états and weakening of the
neocolonial states.
From the commonality of issues facing
West Africa, it is abundantly evident we would require deepening our knowledge
and understanding the contentious issues at the regional level. Furthermore,
the territories of the Alliance of the Sahelian States (AES) are populated by
numerous marginalized indigenous peoples such as the Mbororo-Bororo/Wodaabe in
Mali, Tuareg and the Tuhu-Teda/Daza in Niger. The historical obsessions of
these peoples towards protection of their pre-colonial space and asserting
their rights to traditional nomadic way of life are believed to be one of the
destabilising factors within the Sahara-Sahel region. This has to be studied
comprehensively and understood if peace were to be restored into the
Sahara-Sahel in particular and West Africa in general.
During 2023, ACAR with the assistance of a team of researchers conducted
extensive desk research covering sixteen West African countries[1].
This report however focuses on the AES countries. It applies the methods of
historical analysis including drawing from appropriate sources as well as
information from contemporary authorities to examine the origins of the crises
faced within the AES.
Introduction
The spate of “anti-imperialist coups des états[2]”
in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger was the direct result of massive civil
dissatisfaction over the poor handling of the armed insurrections by the
respective civilian governments. It
would be recalled that from the start of 2022, these countries continually
experienced increased jihadists insurgency and non-state armed groups attacks
particularly within the Liptako-Gourma Area. These attacks were followed by
extensive population displacements despite interventions from the French
Legionnaire, United Nations’ peacekeepers and the siting of several foreign
military bases within the Sahel area.
To take sovereignty into their own hands, Mali,
Burkina Faso and Niger signed a military and mutual economic pact to constitute
themselves into an Alliance of Sahel States (AES)[3].
This Alliance presents them an opportunity to break out of the neocolonial hold
of the metropolis, take a different path of development while riding on
anti-French imperialist sentiments and to emerge as an alternative pole[4] to
ECOWAS. Additionally, as members of the AES, they will able to harness their
synergy to secure mutual security against the jihadist insurgency.
At the close of 2023, the AES countries have fully
broken diplomatic and economic ties with France including defence accords and
expelled France[5] from the various
territories including the latter’s military bases. In March 2024, Niger- one of
the constituent members of the Alliance- has also refused to renew the lease of
United States’ largest air drone base and asked for its closure. As of now, the
AES countries have moved closer to Russia which has signed mutual economic,
defence and security pacts with each member country. The latter is also known
to be assisting Burkina Faso to build a nuclear facility.
This essay seeks to provide a platform for dialogue in
a push to build and promote a healthy exchange of information throughout West
Africa. The paper is divided into three related parts. The first part presents
an overview of the AES countries in terms of its geography (location, land
size, topography, climate, vegetation, etc.), extractive wealth, infrastructure
and production. It further addresses questions on political economy. The second part
delves into the current state of the conflict and the drivers of insecurity
particularly in the Liptako-Gourma, Boucle du Mouhoun and Ménaka Regions as
well as those of the subjective factors of social change. The last section
evaluates AES as a Pan-African
Union.
PART ONE
Geography
Location
and other Demographics
The landlocked countries
of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) share boundaries with Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria to the south, Chad to the east, Algeria and
Libya to the north and Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea to the west. It has
a contiguous land space of 2,784,415 km2 representing some 45.54% of
the total land area of
West Africa (approximately
6,114,862 km2) and an estimated population of 73,748,026 in 2023.
The latter constitutes 16.33% of the West African estimated population (443,437,966)
in 2023. AES is sparsely populated when contrasted with the rest of West Africa
which has an average population density of 72.52 persons per km2.
The corresponding population density for AES is 26.49 persons per km2.
Topography
The landscape of the AES lies wholly
within the geomorphology of the Sahel and Sahara. The dominating landscape in
the southern parts are typical undulating gentle peneplain with an average
elevation of 284m above mean sea level. This rises to high plateaux and
escarpments in the north and southeast and rugged hills in the northeast with
elevations above 1,000m. In the southwest are the Fouta Djallon Highlands. The
northern highlands, particularly those in Niger, are extensions of the Ahaggar
Mountains Range running from Algeria to the Tibesti Mountains of Chad. The
highest point on this range is Mount
Gréboun (1,944m). The sandy
regions extend from the desert zones of Mali’s north to Aïr in in the Nigerien Sahara. The plains are drained by
rivers Senegal, Niger, Black, Red and White Voltas. There are also large
reserves of underground water awaiting to be tapped.
Climate
The territory of the
AES lies within the hot semi-arid climate to that of the dry tropical desert.
In the southern parts, the climate is characteristically Sahelian with mean
diurnal temperatures hovering between 240C to 33.80C and
night temperatures falling to 160C. The unimodal rainy season lasting
from June to October, and a long dry season from November to April. The
recorded mean annual rainfall is between 600mm and 900mm. For the dry tropical
desert climate, the mean diurnal temperatures vary from 420C to 450C
dropping to freezing levels. The rainy season is brief and irregular around
250mm annually and largely influenced by the position of the Inter-Tropical
Convergence Zone (ITCZ). The cool dry season is however from November to
February. Annual groundwater recharged in the Sahara area is abysmally
low around 1 ~ 13 mm/a
owing to low precipitation experienced in this region of the AES.
Vegetation
The
steppes of the Sahel regions of AES usually have sparse vegetation with
low-growing grassland and tall herbaceous perennials of the savanna. The
dominant trees are the acacia tortilis, baobab and thorny shrubs. The desert
vegetation, on the other hand, is mainly made up of cacti plants, date palms,
ground- hugging shrubs and acacia. Short woody trees with water-conserving
features also predominate.
Peoples
and Language
The predominant linguistic group is the Songhai and
this language is spoken in the three constituent countries of AES. Other
linguistic groups consist of Hausa, Fula or Fulbe, Mande, Tamashek, Teda,
Mossi, and Gurunsi. Although many of the people speak Arabic as the common
lingua franca, French remains the language of business and commerce. The latter
is however spoken and understood by a small minority. The territory’s ethnic
groups correspond largely to the above-named linguistic groupings with Mande,
Mossi and Hausa ethnic groups being the predominant groups in Mali, Burkina
Faso and Niger respectively.
Overview of
Extractive Wealth
AES is very richly endowed in extractive wealth. Her
mineral resource endowment includes large reserves of uranium, gold, manganese,
coal, iron ore, tin, phosphates, and crude oil. Others are molybdenum, salt, copper,
lithium, limestone and gypsum. Her plant resources include the doum and palmyra
plants which provide wood for construction, dates, gums from acacia and kapok
trees. The latter is used for insulation, life jackets and so on.
The constituent states are also blessed with birds such as ostriches and reptiles (crocodiles and snakes) whose skins are extracted to make exotic handicraft for export to Europe. Despite most of her territory falling within the semi-arid climatic zone, it has the Senegal, Niger, Black, Red and White Voltas draining and watering its naturally endowed arable lands. AES is also home to a variety of wildlife that include elephants, lions, and cheetahs.
Mineral Wealth
The mineral wealth of the AES is extracted by major
international mining companies from France, Canada, Australia, South Korea,
Japan and China through fit for purpose subsidiaries. Niger’s uranium reserves[6] in Akokan, and Arlit, for instance, are currently mined
by ORANO[7] Canada; a successor to AREVA Resource Canada
Incorporated with its headquarters in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada. Table 1
presents the capital structure and ownership of ORANO Canada. Its subsidiaries
in Niger are SOMAΪR, COMINAK and IMOURAREN. While SOMAΪR is wholly owned by
ORANO Canada, it directly or indirectly controls 34% of COMINAK and IMOURAREN
capital. Other shareholders of COMINAK are SOPAMIN, a Nigerien public company
(31%), Overseas Uraniun Resources Development Company of Japan (25%) and Enusa
Industrias Avanzadas S.A. of Spain (10%).
Table 1: Capital Structure of ORANO Canada
|
Shareholder |
% Holding |
|
French State |
56.31 |
|
CEA[8] |
35.70 |
|
Bpi[9]france Participations S.A. |
1.08 |
|
Total French State |
93.09 |
|
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) |
3.13 |
|
EDF Group |
1.46 |
|
AREVA Employees |
0.70 |
|
Public |
1.32 |
|
Treasury Shares |
0.08 |
|
Total |
100.00 |
Source: https://cdn.orano.group; https://mscf.ca>orano canada - Jim Corman PDF, 17 April 2024
In spite of the fact that some 140,000 tons of uranium wealth had been
extracted by the ORANO Group between 1971 and 1922 from Niger and exported to
France and the European Union, the extraction never benefited the good people
and economy of Niger directly[10]. This is despite France being the historical buyer of
Nigerien uranium. France is not the only player in AES’ uranium mining. China
and South Korea are involved in the Azelik mine located some 200 kilometres
from Arlit. The Azelik uranium mine is operated by SOMINA a subsidiary of China
National Nuclear Corporation with 37.2% capital holding, SOPAMIN (a Nigerien
state mining company) – 33.0%, ZXJOY (a Chinese private company) – 24.8% and
Korean National Company (KORES), 5%.
Gold is the other important mineral wealth endowment of
the AES. This mineral is present in all the three countries with over 7 million
ounces of proven resources. The gold extraction industry serves as the largest
employer in Mali providing livelihood to some 2,000,000 people at the end of
2022. Industrial and artisanal[11] mining is carried out by foreign and local companies.
The major foreign multinational companies engaged in primary prospecting,
extraction and processing of gold ore are Barrick Gold Corporation[12], B2Gold Corp., and IAMGOLD Corporation. Barrick Gold
Corporation is based in Canada and known for the production of gold and copper
with mines in Mali (Marila/Loulo-Gounkoto[13]), Côte d’Ivoire (Tongon), Tanzania, Democratic Republic
of Congo, the Dominican Republic, Argentina and the United States. Its
ownership and capital structure are presented in Table 2.
B2Gold Corp[14], the other major multinational mining conglomerate, that
operates in AES (Mali), specializes in gold exploration and has mines in
Nicaragua, Namibia, and The Philippines while IAMGOLD[15], which owns and operates three gold mine concessions in
Burkina Faso (Essakane/Yatela/Sadiola Gold Mines), Suriname and Canada, is an
intermediate gold producer and developer. The structure of ownership and size
of capital holding of B2Gold Corp is presented in Table 3.
Artisanal gold mining, on the other hand, is largely
carried out by mafia-like criminals using small-scale unregistered small
companies and accounts for 10% of all gold production in Mali and Burkina Faso. One outcome of this is the influx of migrants
and child labour from the adjoining southern countries into the gold mining
areas of Mali and Burkina Faso. Owing to the absence of smelting and refining
facilities, much of the ore mined by both segments of the industry remained
unprocessed and un-refined prior to export[16].
Table 2: Ownership and Capital Structure of
Barrick Gold Corporation
|
Shareholder |
% Holding |
Citizenship |
|
The Vanguard Group, Inc |
5.617 |
United States |
|
Capital Research & Management Co. (World Investors) |
2.962 |
United States |
|
Wellington Management Co. LLP |
2.672 |
United States |
|
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd |
4.646 |
British |
|
First Eagle Investment Management LLC |
2.303 |
United States |
|
Flossbach von Storch AG |
1.880 |
German |
|
Fidelity Management & Research Co. LLC |
1.634 |
United States |
|
RBC Global Asset Management, Inc |
1.274 |
Canada |
|
Hercules Silver Corp |
14.530 |
Canada |
|
Gold Royalty Corp |
6.480 |
United States |
|
Cascadia Minerals Ltd |
7.590 |
Canada |
|
Augusta Gold Corp |
10.590 |
United States |
|
Alturas Minerals Corp |
10.800 |
Canada |
Source : https://mmeg.cnn.com
Other extractive resources include salt, hydrated sodium
carbonate, cassiterite, gypsum, tungsten, limestone, phosphate and crude oil.
The most important are salt and crude oil. The salt is mined in the
Kaouar-Manga-Dallol regions of Niger while the crude oil is exploited in eastern
and the central regions of Niger by China National Petroleum Corp[17], SONATRAC of Algeria through its international
subsidiary SIPEX, Savannah Energy[18] of the United Kingdom and China International Petroleum
Bilma. AES, through Niger, would become a significant oil and gas producer and
exporter after Nigeria given that the current appraised oil reserves is in the
neighbourhood of 3,754 million of barrels with 957 million barrels of
recoverable reserves while that of gas is 34 billion cubic metres and
recoverable reserves of 24 billion cubic metres.
Table 3: Ownership and Capital Structure of
B2Gold Corp
|
Shareholder |
% Holding |
Citizenship |
|
Bemetals Corp |
18.760 |
Canada |
|
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd |
7.316 |
British |
|
Matador Mining Limited |
6.040 |
Australia |
|
Fidelity Management & Research Co. LLC |
6.285 |
United States |
|
The Vanguard Group, Inc. |
5.917 |
United States |
|
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP |
2.755 |
United States |
|
Renaissance Technologies LLC |
2.303 |
United States |
|
RBC Global Asset Management, Inc |
1.934 |
Canada |
|
Calibre Mining Corp. |
23.930 |
Canada |
|
West African Resources Ltd |
2.160 |
Australia |
|
Fidelity Management Trust Co. |
1.421 |
United States |
|
Two Sigma Investments LP |
1.076 |
United States |
|
Two Sigma Advisors LP |
0.913 |
United States |
Source:
Agriculture
and Food Security
Agriculture
and agricultural products make up the significant sector of the AES’s economy
in terms of the number of persons employed and the percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP). In spite of the foregoing, agricultural production levels are generally low within the AES
affecting food availability and security requiring large food imports and
assistance from international donors. The farming systems are characterised by shifting cultivation, terrace farming and nomadic
herding. The main constraints to crop and food
production within the AES remain one of water, technological barriers centering
on crude and rudimentary implements as well as issues relating to soil
management.
The main agricultural crops are cotton for export, millet,
wheat,
sorghum, cassava, yam, rice, groundnuts,
tobacco, sugarcane and tea as food crops, and livestock (i.e., cattle, sheep, and goats). Just like everywhere in West Africa, crop production
is seasonal in many ecological zones of the AES constraining household food
availability and security. This is not surprising because the concentration is
on primary production and processing with very minimal secondary production in
terms of processing, and packaging into diversified food products.
The AES countries are further known to be vulnerable
to issues of climate change, loss of biodiversity, environmental hazards, low
levels of adaptability and declining agricultural
production. Some of these particularly
those related to environmental degradation are caused by crude oil exploration
and extraction by multinational companies, unbridled mineral and natural
resource exploitation by local populations and localised fuel politics. A Study
conducted in 2023 by World Food Programme and FAO predicted 3.35
million people in Burkina Faso, 3.28 million people in Niger and Mali 1.26
million people facing various degrees of acute food
insecurity and deficit
issues[19].
Infrastructure
Transportation
(Road, Railway, Air)
Currently, the three countries are not interlinked in
terms of national and transboundary road, railway and air networks. There is also proliferation of internal trade barriers
for custom goods along each constituent’s national corridors and at
international borders. These bottlenecks tend
to disrupt supply chains and movement of peoples deepening the economic
fragility of the AES countries forcing farmers and
firms to concentrate their products within the present frameworks of localized
non-networked markets.
Energy
AES, on the average, has one of the lowest rates of
electricity generation, transmission, distribution, penetration and access in
West Africa despite adequate optimal solar irradiation and the abundant endowment of large uranium and fossil fuel deposits
(crude oil & natural gas). Consequently, its energy market is still highly
undeveloped, fragmented with very little integration of national grids and
other utilities’ systems. The current penetration
rates are 53.38% for Mali[20]
generated largely from hydraulic production (%5%) and diesel (45%), 21% for
Burkina Faso, and less than 20% in Niger.
Financial
Institutions
Being in the same FCFA zone, the AES’
monetary, payments and settlements systems are much better integrated than the
anglophone and Lusophone zones of West Africa. The FCFA is tradable amongst
them and they do not have much internal constraints towards mobilization of
large domestic financial resources and financing for investment and trade. This
is about to change with the decision to move away from the FCFA zone, issue the
Alliance's own currency and establish new payments and settlements systems.
PART TWO
Conflict,
Insecurity and Population Displacement
Genesis
The main
conflict zones are concentrated in the Liptako-Gourma Region overlapping Mali,
Niger and Burkina Faso, Boucle du Mouhoun and Ménaka Regions of Mali, and the
Lake Chad Basin. The persistent conflict and worsening civil insecurity in
these zones are also the key drivers of acute food insecurity within the AES
and the cause of large population displacements. In May 2023, over 6.7 million
people were estimated to be internally displaced in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
the Niger and Nigeria, an increase of over 10 percent compared to the same
period in 2022[21].
The
current conflict and insecurity are traceable to the NATO invasion of Libya in
2011 and the subsequent civil war which led to dismemberment of that country.
The aftermath of the Libyan conflict led to unregulated inflow of small arms
& light weapons into the Sahara-Sahel regions (particularly, Mali, Burkina
Faso and Mali) accompanied by incursion of armed jihadist fighters. By 2012,
Mali became faced with a Tuareg insurgency led by the National Movement for the
Liberation of AZAWAD (MNLA)[22]. A fall-out of this insurgency was the
emergence of dual State and total collapse of civil institutions and public
infrastructure throughout northern Mali especially in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu
administrative regions. After the extremist forces were expelled from northern
Mali, the Government of Mali entered into a peace deal in 2015 with MNLA and
other Tuareg groups.
However,
in 2017, AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine merged to form JNIM (Jama’at Nasral-Islam wal Muslimin) and moved
its operations to central Mali after capturing Konna. It is JNIM, an affiliate
of al-Qaeda which spread the conflict to Burkina Faso in a strategic move from Konna. To become fully operational in Liptako-Gourma
Region, JNIM then entered into a new symbiotic alliance with ISGS (Islamic
State in the Greater Sahara); an affiliate of Islamic State. It was from that
time onwards that Liptako-Gourma became the hotbed for extremist violence in
the West African Sahel. Prior to the formation of the alliance through the
signing of the Liptako-Gourma Pact, JNIM was active within central and northern
Mali while ISGS has its main centres of operation located in northern Burkina
Faso[23] and western Niger.
Liptako-Gourma Region
The
region is entirely located within the semi-arid Sahel zone of West Africa and
covers the contiguous border regions of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. It
consists of 19 provinces of Burkina Faso, 4 administrative regions of Mali, and
2 departments (Téra, Say) and an urban community of Niger. With an area of
370,000 km2., the region has a topology of considerable lateritic
plateau with a general elevation of 252m above mean sea level. Given its
population size of over 18 million, the region is sparsely populated with a
population density of 48.65 persons/km2. The population is composed
of Fula, Tuaregs, Songhai, Mossi, Hausa, Gourmantche and Buzu peoples.
In terms of natural
endowment, the Liptako-Gourma Region is endowed with extensive arable land
suitable for agriculture and animal husbandry (mostly herding). It has
considerable energy resources, hydraulic and mining potential as well as
extensive transboundary ground and underground water resources covering an
estimated area of 159,000 km2. The latter is centred on the middle
basins of the Niger River. Her main mineral wealth are gold, quartz, and
manganese.
Despite
its great potential and viability, the region has since 2012 become the
epicentre of jihadist insurgency, organized crime, banditry, and illegal
cross-border operations by non-state armed groups owing to various social and
economic factors. The present lack of economic opportunities reinforced by
climatic variability has led to loss of livelihood opportunities amongst the
youth of the region. The disastrous effects of climate change on agriculture
and food security have also increased demographic pressure over dwindling
resources with the resultant dampening income effect increasing the overall
poverty level. Besides the near absence of state institutions within the region
coupled with low levels of legitimacy of State and Public Authorities in the
eyes of civil society and limited access to levels of basic public goods and
social services have also heightened communal tensions. Finally, the existence
of these voids favoured the presence of various armed non-state actors who now
provide some levels of civic services to the people.
Boucle du Mouhoun Region of
Burkina Faso
Another
epicentre of the ongoing conflict is the Boucle du Mouhoun Region of Burkina Faso. It is located along the
bend of the Black Volta River and covers an area of 34,162 km2 with
relatively rich arable lands. The region has a population of
1,901,229 (2019)[24]
of which 49.9% is below the ages of 15 years and additional 18.2% between the
ages of 15 years and 24 years. Being the poorest region of Burkina Faso with a
poverty index of 59.5%[25], it has become the hotbed
of the conflict and the centre of annual child labour exodus to cocoa and
cotton farms in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Benin.
The region’s security situation has
deteriorated since the beginning of 2023 with escalating attacks by JNIM and
Ansar-ul Islam displacing tens of thousands of people from their villages and
livelihoods.
For
a long time, the Ménaka Region was the major centre of the jihadist
belligerence in Mali controlled by al-Qaeda affiliated JNIM, ISGS and the Dozo
militia. At the height of the bellicoseness, the region hosted some 78,500
internally displaced persons. The Region, which is a traditional confederacy
centre of the Kel Dinnik Tuareg tribe, is located in Mali’s northeastern Sahara
Desert border regions with Niger. The sparsely populated Region is domiciled by
nomadic Tuareg tribes, Fula and Songhai and has a total area of 81,040 km2.
Besides
being located in agroecological zone where food insecurity and poverty levels
tend to be high, this region have extensive territories that are cut off
administratively from the rest of the country. It is also denied of such basic
public goods as security, education, health and potable water which makes it
easier for JNIM to adapt local political conditions to extend its influence and
project power. It was these dehumanizing situations that Islamic fundamental
groups such as JNIM, ISGS, and various ethnic AZAWAD separatist movements
exploited by providing various levels of basic services, delivering justice
while relying on traditional dispute mediation and creating needed jobs in the
security sectors[26].
These jihadist groups also projected their power through violent means using
sabotaging or destroying of central government critical infrastructure and
implementing policies of forced displacement of local populations.
The Lake Chad Region
This
region which extends from southeast Niger, northeastern Nigeria (Yobe, Adamawa
& Bornu), western Chad to northern Cameroun is a resource poor area with
high levels of endemic poverty. Owing to the region’s degraded pastures induced
by climate chain effects, there has been keen competition over water rights
fuelling decades of internecine conflicts and insecurity. It is therefore not
surprising that the Lake Chad Region continues to witness explosion of
non-state actors be it tribal militias, cattle rustling criminal networks,
bandits specializing in kidnapping for ransom or simple highway men.
Bokom
Haram alias Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad[27]; a Nigerian Taliban group
is the main Islamic Jihad sect operating within the Lake Chad Region. As at the
close of 2023, 2.9 million people have been internally displaced. An additional
5.54 million people were also categorised as food insecure in both northeast
Nigeria and southeast Niger.
Current State of the Conflict
By
and large, the security situation across the AES’ territorial space continues
to be somewhat precarious[28] and unpredictable even
though the combined armed forces of the Alliance members had made impressive
territorial gains and pushed back several jihadist groups. With popular support of their populations, the Ménaka Region of Mali had been
liberated. The Alliance forces
also did march successfully on other several terrorist bases regaining control of most
areas while containing other actors in endemic
areas. These victories allowed schools to be reopened and resettlement
schemes implemented for good number of internally displaced population.
Despite these gains, several hundreds of
thousands of displaced populations are unwillingly to return to their villages
and livelihood due to safety reasons. One contributory factor is the limited
operational capabilities of the security forces and the ineffective roles of
their allied auxiliary Volunteer Militias[29]. It is worth-mentioning that in the case of
Burkina Faso, the 50,000 strong forces[30] were formed out of two
ethnic-based private militias of the Koglweogo and Dozo and instead of being an
inclusive force of arm, it carried out operations along ethnic lines committing
and carrying out extra-judicial arrests, killings, rape and torture. So far,
the security authorities’ dual purpose of controlling activities of these
auxiliary forces and using them as vehicles to mobilize and defeat the
insurgents have not been met.
Since the close of 2021, the Alliance forces have reorganized under
single command with superior improvements in tactical planning and support from the Russian Wagner Group[31] and
are currently on the offensive. The present turn of events can be attributed to
the military juntas’ re-prioritization of security and the setting up of
Patriotic Support Fund in which citizens made direct contributions towards
prosecution of the war effort. Another contributory factor was the smart
financing strategy adopted by the military junta of each member country.
Subsidies, for instance, were removed on petroleum and other consumptive goods
and the savings made were used in procuring military equipment, munitions and
other war materials from Turkey, Russia, North Korea and China. With the Russians leading the
pack, there were increased access to better situational intelligence. Besides, as a result of ascendancy in
patriotism driven by anti-French feelings, the people of the Sahel were more
willing to mobilize and defend their territorial spaces.
The Jihadist Rebellion
It would be
recalled that the strategic objective of the jihadist rebellion in the Sahel
besides holding, capturing and/or expanding territory is to secure new recruits
so as to replenish its ranks and file. The withdrawal of French troops and
MINUSMA from conflict zones[32]
and the initial weak logistic support condition of the Malian Security &
Defense Forces in the early 2020s provided the keg to the re-occupation of
territorial spaces in Mali and Burkina Faso in particular. The jihadist also
took advantage of opportunities offered by numerous inter-communal conflicts
and general prevalence of political instability following the NATO invasion of
Libya.
However, the tides
had changed since the announcement and implementation of the military alliance.
The first casualty was the decision of Coordination of Movements of AZAWAD to
withdraw from the implementation of the 2015 Peace Plan following the failure
of the Mali’s military junta to commit to an electoral calendar and provide
definite date of handing over to a democratically elected government. This led to the collapse of the Algiers Accord of
2015.
The Algiers peace agreement for Mali remains incompletely implemented. It is
worthy of note that the parties have never implemented the substantive
regionalization reforms defined in Sections I & II of the Agreement which
laid out the political and institutional autonomy of the Northern Regions.
Following their
defeat in central and northern by the Alliance Forces, the jihadist rebellion
is now stymied and on the backfoot.
Foreign Military Presence in
AES
An outcome
of the NATO’s intervention in Libya was the incursion of Islamic State’s
fighters into the Sahara-Sahel Region accompanied by the establishment of
jihadist terrorist cells. This led to France in 2013 sending its expeditionary
forces into Mali under Operation Serval to counteract them. This singular act
opened the door for foreign Military Presence in West Africa. France was
followed by other members of the European Union namely Germany, Italy and
Belgium, the United States and United Kingdom.
It would
be recalled prior to the Alliance,
there were six foreign countries that have and operate land (9), air (10) and
naval (1) bases[33]
in West Africa. France and the United States dominate with presence in five
West African countries respectively. The US is present in Niger, Burkina Faso,
Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria whiles France is in Mali, Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal,
Burkina Faso and Niger. Germany has bases in Niger and Mali whiles Italy and
the UK are present in Niger, Mali respectively. Finally, Belgium has a base in
Mali.
Currently, with the popular support of their
various populations who demanded the closure of French bases and withdrawal of
her troops from the Alliance’s member countries, France had withdrawn her
troops and closed her bases in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. This was
followed by the closure of Belgian, German, Italian and British bases as well
as the withdrawal of UN Peacekeeping Forces (MINUSMA) at the close of 2023. As
could be expected, the Nigerien Authorities in February declined to renew the
leases of the American bases. It is not known whether the US will be removing
its military bases from Niger.
The Role of Wagner Group of
Russia
The Wagner Group of Russia has
played a crucial role in steadying and restoring the territorial integrity of
the AES countries. The various constituent governments have signed separate
military pacts with Russia[34] and
went on to deploy personnel, tactical vehicles and war materials to strengthen
the strategic capacities and operational capabilities of the Alliance armed
forces. The Wagner Group has some 3,000 mercenaries including instructors
deployed in Central Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger where they are currently
fighting insurgency groups. The group also provides tactical support in terms
of operational planning. For now, there are no Russian boots on the ground.
State
of the Alliance[35]
It is
worth-mentioning that the current Military Pact is not the first ever mutual
defence pact signed by the three countries. In 2017, Mali, Burkina Faso and
Niger had a similar agreement in which they established a joint task force to
confront jihadist insurgency threats including general insecurity within the
Liptako-Gourma Region[36]. The current pact
therefore seeks not only to revive the defunct agreement and provide united
front to confront the threats of potential external aggression or internal
armed rebellions but also aimed at responding to the ECOWAS threat to intervene
militarily in Niger. It would be recalled that following a military coup led by
the Presidential Guards, which overthrew the legally elected President Mohamed
Bazoum of the Republic, ECOWAS provoked a Nigerien Crisis in a bid to restore
constitutional rule.
It would
further be recalled that apart from the Alliance members being in a state of
low armed insurgency since 2003 from communal tensions, jihadist strife,
constitutional coups by politicians and military coup d’états; there has also
been significant displacement of population. By August 2023, the total number of persons
displaced was 2,948,799[37].
The future
of the Alliance would depend on how early minimum security and sovereignty
could be restored throughout the territory of the alliance. It would also
depend on how long will the current military juntas want to clasp to power. All
told, there is the likelihood of a new model of governance and sharing of power
emerging through a conscious development of popular organs, institutions and
vanguard of the people. This may also include successful de-institutionalising
of current bourgeois elective and representation systems; and building
self-reliant planned economies through the control and judicious use of
appropriated endowed resources. It would also mean moving away from the present
neocolonial arrangements and relations towards political integration and
building a Pan-Africanist AES which is broadly anti-imperialist. Finally, this
would require providing an entry in the present Charter for other countries,
within or outside West Africa, seeking genuine sovereignty and African Unity to
freely elect to join.
Meanwhile, there are efforts to withdraw from
the FCFA monetary zone and to print the Alliance’s own currency to be known as
the “Sahel” in addition to establishing a own central bank to be in charge of
the Alliance’s monetary policy.
The ECOWAS Web
Since the overthrow by the military of the
constitutions and lawful civilian governments in the three countries, there has
been several ECOWAS’ reactions and grandstanding over the unconstitutional and
illegal interventions. The alliance members, for instance, have been suspended
from ECOWAS and various levels of punishing sanctions imposed. These sanctions
are supported by the AU, EU, US, and UN. At one stage, ECOWAS threatened to
invade Niger and to restore the constitutional authority of President Bazoum.
So far, attempts to use diplomatic means to resolve the standoff have failed
owing to the stance taken by ECOWAS. Subsequently, the Alliance States have
exited[38] ECOWAS[39].
CONCLUSION
L'Alliance des
États du Sahel (AES) created in September 2023 by Mali, Burkina Faso
and Niger is essentially a military cum economic accord. There will also be the
need to enter into some political union tailored along the lines of confederacy
with clear-cut constitution and devolution of power. Such a road will require
ideological clarity of the current leadership, massive mobilisation of popular
forces within the AES and reformation or building of new institutions that are
people-centred. It will also be imperative to raise the current low social
consciousness prevalent and working diligently to secure the material
well-being of the mass of the people.
REFERENCES
ECOWAS Commission. The West African Food Security
Storage System: Synthesis of lessons learnt and perspectives. 2021. https://www.google.com/search?q=handling+and+storage+issues+in+west+africa+agriculture&oq=handling+and+storage+issues+in+west+africa+agriculture&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigAdIBCTM1OTgyajBqN6gCALACAA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
FAO.
2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation – Quarterly Global Report No. 2, July
2023. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc6806en; https://dtm.iom.int/report-product-series/liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard
FAOSTAT and Agriculture Statistics Directorate -2021; https://www.wfp.org/news/food-insecurity-and-malnutrition-west-and-central-africa-10-year-high-crisis-spreads-coastal# ; Djaounsede.madjiangar@wfp.org
Lloyd,
Robert B. “Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali.” The
SAIS Review of International Affairs, vol. 36, no. 1, 2016, pp.
133–41. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27001424.
Accessed 25 Oct. 2023.
MALI Violence
in Ménaka and Gao regions - ACAPS, Thematic Report, 16 June 2022 https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20220616_acaps_briefing_note_violence_in_mali.pdf
Non-State Armed
Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: JNIM, October 18, 2023 ACLED ; GITOC;
https://dtm.iom.int/report-product-series/liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard
2023 West Africa Economic Outlook; July 27, 2023, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/2023-west-africa-economic-outlook-regions-economic-growth-falls-medium-term-forecast-suggests-return-level-above-4-63487
Vilar
(ed) (2012) ‘Renewable Energy in Western Africa: Situation, Experiences and
Trends’, ECREEE and Casa Africa www.ecreee.org/sites/default/files/renewable_energy_in_west_africa_0.pdf
Willemien
Viljoen, “Transportation costs and efficiency in West and Central Africa” https://tralac.org/discussions/article/9364-transportation-costs-and-efficiency-in-west-and-central-africa.html
Orano, Consolidated Financial Statements, Dec.31, 2022; https://cdn.orano.group; https://www.orano.group
Orano Canada Inc., 26 April 2023; https://mscf.ca/ckfinder/userfiles/orano%20canada%20-%lewsi%20Haddad%20FINAL%20correction.pdf
https://mscf.ca>OranoCanada-Jim Gorman PDF, 17April 2024
https://www.b2gold.com>Q4-FS-2023 pdf
https:www.b2gold.com>_resources>financials pdf; Mar.2020
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https://fintel.io>US>B2Gold Corp
[1] The only country not covered is the island State of Saint Helena.
[2] At present, anti-French sentiments have heightened transforming
these military interventions into popular struggles for national sovereignty
and independence.
[3] Currently, all the AES countries are ruled by
military juntas and are under various forms of economic sanctions imposed by
ECOWAS, AU, EU and UN.
[4] The contiguous territory of AES and size has provided a competing
geopolitical threat to ECOWAS; the regional economic community.
[5] France’s Presse Agency and France24 media were also
asked to discontinue their media presence and leave the respective territories.
[6] AES currently has 5% of the world’s uranium reserves or some
311,100 tons U
[7] Following the restructuring and recapitalization of the nuclear
conglomerate AREVA, it was renamed ORANO S.A. ORANO, which is headquartered in
France, is in uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, spent-fuel recycling and
nuclear engineering activities.
[8] Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et
aux énergies alternatives (CEA)
[9] Banque Publique d’Investissement (Bpi)
[10] It is worthy of note that France throughout the period
until the sovereign coup d’etat in June/July 2023 had bought Nigerien uranium
at a rate of €0.80 per kilogram compared with €200 per kilogram she had paid
for similar uranium from Canada. It was therefore not surprising when the first
action of the Nigerien Authorities had to do with increasing its selling rate
to €200 per kilogram.
[11] There are over 350 artisanal mines in the three countries
constituting the AES at the end of 2023 employing a little over 500,000 direct
mine workers.
[12] Founder of Barrick Gold Corp is Peter D. Munk
[13] Barrick Gold Corp owns 80% of the capital of Société de Mines des
Gounkoto and Société de Mines de Loulo SA respectively while the remainder in each
company is owned by the Malian State. Both mines have a proven reserve of 6.7
million ounces of recoverable gold. In 2022 alone, both mines produced 547,000
fine ounces of gold
[14] Founder of B2Gold Corporation is Clive Johnson
[15] IAMGOLD is founded by Mark I. Nathanson and William D. Pugliese
[16] Burkina Faso, a constituent member of the Alliance, has
taken steps to address this through building a gold refinery.
[17] China National Petroleum Corp produces 20,000 b/d of crude oil at
the Agadem Rift Basin through a consortium comprising OPIC (a wholly owned
subsidiary of CPC Corporation of Taiwan and the State of Niger.
[18] Savannah Energy operates also in the crude oil and gas sectors of
Nigeria, Cameroon and South Sudan. It currently has exploration license in
Niger within the Amdigh, Eridal, Bushiya, Kumana oil reserves where it intends
bringing up to four oil wells on stream in 2025.
[19] Source: FAOSTAT and Agriculture Statistics
Directorate, 2021
[20] The total installed capacity from hydro production and solar is 310
MW
[21] Source: FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation –
Quarterly Global Report No. 2, July 2023. Rome.
https://doi.org/10.4060/cc6806en
[22] It would be recalled that the MNLA had earlier on
allied with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and
JIHAD in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine to occupy and declare an
independent state of AZAWAD in northern Mali.
[23] ISGS initial operation
in Burkina Faso was in September 2016 after attacking and controlling a border
post near the city of Markoye.
[24] Estimated population for 2024 is
2,120,626 and a population density of 55.65 persons/km2
[25] The mean national
poverty index is estimated at 40.1%
[26] Of course, the objective is to run parallel underground
economies for the generation and financing of war operations and to establish
alternative governance systems. These largely take the form of imposing and
collecting taxes in the gold mining operations under their sphere of influence.
[27] The group has recently increased its attacks in and
around Maiduguri as well as weaponisation of food resulting in loss of lives,
livelihoods and displacements of local populations.
[28] In the
case of Burkina Faso, the jihadists’ insurgents breached more than half of her
territorial integrity.
[29] The VDF
(Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland) was reorganized at the beginning
of 2023 along the concept of popular defence by the present military junta
under the leadership of Colonel Kabore and given 14-days military training.
[30] 35,000 of the auxiliary
force has been assigned to protect the local communities while the remainder of
15,000 have been integrated into the country’s security and defense
architecture.
[31] The Wagner
Group is a Russian private and private
military auxiliary force consisting of ex-servicemen with extensive combat
experiences who offer their services for money. As a quasi-state armed group,
it has several presence in Africa notably Central African Republic and Sudan
and oftentimes used by the Russian Government to executes its geopolitical
objectives.
[32] The pull-out of French Expeditionary Forces in October
2022 which brought Operation Barkhane to an end created a military and security
vacuum in the theatres of operation.
[33] Key military operations
carried out by these foreign military bases include training and technical
assistance, logistics support, anti-piracy operations, intelligence and
surveillance operations, and peacekeeping missions.
[34] The relationship with the Alliance States is
strategic. Traditionally, the armed forces of the Alliance members have 80% of
their military arsenals imported from Russia and North Korea. This relationship
dates back to the late 1970s. This is because Russians, unlike the French and
the West, have no curbs or restriction on export of military hardware or
ammunitions and are willing to sell every type of armament to third parties
provided there is an effective demand.
[35] The essence of the current
l'Alliance des États du Sahel (AES)
pact, as stated, is to stave ‘armed rebellion or external aggression’ off and
protect any of the members of the alliance from threats of possible overthrow
from ECOWAS and imperialist France especially as ‘any attack on the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of one or more contracted parties will be considered
an aggression against the other parties.’
[36] The task force, at then, was part
of the multinational force of the G5 Sahel countries comprising forces drawn
from Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Mali, however, withdrew
from the G5 Alliance in May, 2022. It is worthy of note that the G5 Sahel was
an institutional framework within which the Alliance members coordinated
regional development policies and security matters especially those relating to
jihadist insurgency threats of AQIM, MOJWA, Al-Mourabitoun and Bokom Haram.
[37] This constituted 98% of the internally displaced
population. Out of the internally displaced
population, 71% were located in Burkina Faso while Mali,
Niger and Mauritania had 15%, 9% and 3% respectively. A further 321,669
representing 2% of the displaced population spilled over to Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Togo and Benin as refugees.
[38] On 27th January, 2024,
the three member countries of the AES simultaneously announced their respective
exit of the Community. As a consequence, ECOWAS has lost some 44.5% of its land
mass and about 17% of its citizens. Other implications of these exits would include
massive disruption in south-north trade and disruption of current supply
chains, lack of access to seaports located along the coasts of Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria as well as likely intensification of
geopolitical rivalry of great powers. Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Morocco has
offered to provide the AES access to its seaports.
[39] It is
worthy of note that since the exit of Mauritania in December 2000 and her
return in 2017 as an associate member of ECOWAS, no other country has exited
from the community.
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